Australia’s role in the recent chaos
The Australian Prime Minister John Howard arrived in Dili today for his first visit since goodness knows when. It’s certainly his first visit since I arrived in the country a year ago. According to ABC Radio Australia, the purpose of his flying visit was to meet with the newly installed Prime Minister, Jose Ramos-Horta and President Xanana Gusmao; not to mention sharing a morale boosting BBQ lunch with some of the estimated 2,500 Australian security forces currently deployed in Timor.
Of course, Howard’s visit has fuelled the lefty rumours (a la Pilger, Martinkus and the Communist Party of Australia) that the unseating of the former PM Mari Alkatiri was as a result of an Australian backed coup and that Howard has come to congratulate “his” men in Timor. This (conspiracy?) theory says that Australia disliked Alkatiri (true) and wanted to get rid of him in order to get their hands on Timor’s oil (unfounded as Australia and Timor had already negotiated an agreement over the final disputed area in the Timor Sea which is waiting approval by both country’s parliaments but which when passed, will remain in effect for the next 50 years), and wanted the more Australian friendly Ramos-Horta (true) at the helm of the country. That Australia also dislikes Fretilin as it is considered the most radical of the political parties in Timor (true, but radical only in comparison to the other parties, not with its past history and policies or to other more radical parties in the world such as the Communists. I would describe Fretilin as similar to Australia’s Labor Party (even though there is a Timorese Labor Party with no current MPs), which can hardly be described as radical). The theory goes that Australia approached a number of high ranking Timorese military men to stage a coup but that they refused. In the end they somehow managed to convince some of the original 500 odd soldiers from the west of the country to resign in protest over discrimination and favouritism to those from the east, which sparked civil unrest and which led to our evacuation from Timor and the subsequent downfall of the former PM.
This theory fails to explain: why stage a coup now after the disputed oil reserves had been negotiated? The elections are only a year way anyway and given the former PM’s widespread unpopularity, there was speculation that Fretilin would lose seats in parliament as a backlash to their choice of PM. Moreover, how did the Australians manage to engender such vitriol in the Timorese people for their former PM? By osmosis? Normally I’m a great supporter of lefty theories about political coups (not to mention a fan of the writings of Pilger and Martinkus) but having lived in Timor for the past year, I find this latest theory difficult to believe. The Timorese people genuinely disliked their PM which was not manufactured by Australian ASIS spooks.
I believe the recent trouble all comes down to the incompetence and inexperience of a new government left to fend for itself without adequate ongoing international support coupled with the arrogance of a PM and his Ministers who decided that the dismissal of nearly one third of their military personnel was not worth addressing. Moreover, it was the United Nations who decided on the make up of the security forces and clearly not enough attention was paid to the history of the Indonesian occupation and the geographical realities of Timor. By and large, people from the east of the country escaped the worst excesses of the occupation while the people from the west, who were and remain right up against the border with Indonesia, were much more vulnerable to human rights abuses including intimidation to join pro-Jakarta militias in the lead up to the independence ballot. Most of the Falintil soldiers came from the east where it was geographical feasible for them to continue hiding out in the mountains; while the people from the west simple were not able to. For the UN then to divide the newly independent nation’s security forces along geographical lines (military from the east and police from the west) shows a great deal of ignorance in planning the peace and security for a post-conflict society. Unfortunately it has contributed greatly to the current situation which on the surface looks peaceful and secure, but underneath is anything but.
As the Timorese refugees in Darwin and Dili know, there is no secure future for as soon as the International Stabilisation Force departs, they anticipate that all hell will break loose again as further retributions are exacted in a vicious cycle that will be difficult to break. The only hope is that the UN will decide to send a substantial number of both peacekeepers and police officers to retrain a reformed security service. Moreover, that peace building activities amongst the people begins in earnest.
Of course, Howard’s visit has fuelled the lefty rumours (a la Pilger, Martinkus and the Communist Party of Australia) that the unseating of the former PM Mari Alkatiri was as a result of an Australian backed coup and that Howard has come to congratulate “his” men in Timor. This (conspiracy?) theory says that Australia disliked Alkatiri (true) and wanted to get rid of him in order to get their hands on Timor’s oil (unfounded as Australia and Timor had already negotiated an agreement over the final disputed area in the Timor Sea which is waiting approval by both country’s parliaments but which when passed, will remain in effect for the next 50 years), and wanted the more Australian friendly Ramos-Horta (true) at the helm of the country. That Australia also dislikes Fretilin as it is considered the most radical of the political parties in Timor (true, but radical only in comparison to the other parties, not with its past history and policies or to other more radical parties in the world such as the Communists. I would describe Fretilin as similar to Australia’s Labor Party (even though there is a Timorese Labor Party with no current MPs), which can hardly be described as radical). The theory goes that Australia approached a number of high ranking Timorese military men to stage a coup but that they refused. In the end they somehow managed to convince some of the original 500 odd soldiers from the west of the country to resign in protest over discrimination and favouritism to those from the east, which sparked civil unrest and which led to our evacuation from Timor and the subsequent downfall of the former PM.
This theory fails to explain: why stage a coup now after the disputed oil reserves had been negotiated? The elections are only a year way anyway and given the former PM’s widespread unpopularity, there was speculation that Fretilin would lose seats in parliament as a backlash to their choice of PM. Moreover, how did the Australians manage to engender such vitriol in the Timorese people for their former PM? By osmosis? Normally I’m a great supporter of lefty theories about political coups (not to mention a fan of the writings of Pilger and Martinkus) but having lived in Timor for the past year, I find this latest theory difficult to believe. The Timorese people genuinely disliked their PM which was not manufactured by Australian ASIS spooks.
I believe the recent trouble all comes down to the incompetence and inexperience of a new government left to fend for itself without adequate ongoing international support coupled with the arrogance of a PM and his Ministers who decided that the dismissal of nearly one third of their military personnel was not worth addressing. Moreover, it was the United Nations who decided on the make up of the security forces and clearly not enough attention was paid to the history of the Indonesian occupation and the geographical realities of Timor. By and large, people from the east of the country escaped the worst excesses of the occupation while the people from the west, who were and remain right up against the border with Indonesia, were much more vulnerable to human rights abuses including intimidation to join pro-Jakarta militias in the lead up to the independence ballot. Most of the Falintil soldiers came from the east where it was geographical feasible for them to continue hiding out in the mountains; while the people from the west simple were not able to. For the UN then to divide the newly independent nation’s security forces along geographical lines (military from the east and police from the west) shows a great deal of ignorance in planning the peace and security for a post-conflict society. Unfortunately it has contributed greatly to the current situation which on the surface looks peaceful and secure, but underneath is anything but.
As the Timorese refugees in Darwin and Dili know, there is no secure future for as soon as the International Stabilisation Force departs, they anticipate that all hell will break loose again as further retributions are exacted in a vicious cycle that will be difficult to break. The only hope is that the UN will decide to send a substantial number of both peacekeepers and police officers to retrain a reformed security service. Moreover, that peace building activities amongst the people begins in earnest.
Category: Timor-Leste (East Timor)
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My one year anniversary
June 2005
Tumbleweed in Timor Lorosae
Kelly Elizabeth